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Recognition of the DDR: Some Legal Aspects
of West Germany's Foreign Policy and the
Quest for German Reunification
Introduction
T IS PROBABLY SAFE to assert that the key to ddtente in Europe
lies in resolution of the German situation, for it is Germany, lo-
cated in the heart of Europe, where East abruptly meets West. For
almost twenty-five years the German situation has remained a highly
volatile center of controversy. In many instances, it has been the
scene of traumatic confrontations marked by displays of deep emo-
tionalism and drama. Both East as well as West understood the
significance of a post-war Germany; each tried to strengthen their
positions by attempting to bring Germany within their respective
orbits. The stakes were obviously high, yet throughout the post-
war period, the result was stalemate. As one commentator cor-
rectly phrased it, Germany was the stable crisis.' But within the
past two years there has been some movement and progress in the
German situation, a reconciliation of differences.
The German problem has basically revolved around the recogni-
tion of the German Democratic Republic.2 For approximately twen-
ty-five years both the Federal Republic and the United States re-
mained adamant in their repeated refusals to recognize the DDR.
However, when Willy Brandt assumed control over West German
foreign policy, originally as Foreign Minister under the Kiesinger
administration in the days of the Grand Coalition, the Federal Re-
public's attitude toward the DDR was at first modified, then it devel-
oped into a new Ostpolitik based upon the underlying concept that
it was time for Bonn to recognize the realities of existing social and
political conditions in Eastern Europe. At first, West Germans
viewed this new Ostpolitik with great reticence and circumspection,
and rightly so. For the West Germans were accustomed to the
callous and malevolent position which Konrad Adenauer and suc-
ceeding chancellors had taken vis-A-vis relations with the East. And
1 W. HANRIEDER, THE STABLE CRISIS, Two DECADES OF GERMAN FOREIGN
POLICY (1970).
-2 Hereinafter referred to as the DDR (Deutsche Demokratische Republik).
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for many, Adenauer symbolized strength, prosperity, and security.
Therefore, Brandt's initial task was to convince the West German
population that the Adenauer approach toward the DDR and the
East was anachronistic. As time progressed, Brandt was very suc-
cessful in mollifying these misanthropic attitudes.
But even after Willy Brandt succeeded in becoming Chancellor
of the Federal Republic, the rapprochement with the East as well as
the DDR never came to fruition due to a variety of reasons, three
of which were very obtuse, namely, (i) internal discontentment
within his own party, the SPD,3 (ii) general disappointment
among the population at the lack of success achieved in his domestic
policies and (iii) the incessant diatribes launched by ultra-conser-
vatives within the CDU/CSU4 who asserted that Brandt had given
up too much, too soon and had received nothing in return.
However, the Brandt administration was not completely frus-
trated in its ability to create a new Ostpolitik. On the contrary,
the former chancellor made great advancements not only in the
Federal Republic's relations with the DDR but with other Eastern
European countries as well. The various non-aggression treaties as
well as the recognition of the Eastern boundaries were serious de-
partures from the fervidly supported policies of Konrad Adenauer.
Yet, Brandt ultimately won the favorable approval from other
Western nations as well as from his own people who viewed his ef-
forts as an attempt to significantly reduce tension in Central Europe.
The 1970 meetings between Willy Brandt and Willi Stoph, of
the DDR, at Erfurt and Kassel marked the initiation of a new dia-
logue between the two Germanies. It was a dialogue which even-
tually increased in frequency as the years passed: a dialogue which
finally resulted in the recognition of the DDR as a separate German
state in 1972. Although the opposition, the Christian Democrats,
argued that Brandt had proceeded much too swiftly, other Western
powers thought to the contrary, as evidenced by their early recogni-
tion of the DDR as an entity which had achieved the status of a
state through the operation of time.
Recognition of the DDR from the West has basically evolved
from three approaches: the first, based upon an appreciation of real-
politik which conceivably could fall within the Lauterpachtian con-
cept of recognition, the second, essentially a compromise approach
originally formulated by Winston Churchill admitting the exis-
3 Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands.
4 Christliche Demokratische Union/ Christliche Sozial Union.
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tence of a state but declaring with great reservation that recognition
does not necessarily connote approval and third, the American ap-
proach, better known as the Wilsonian view, which mixes recogni-
tion with general principles of morality, viewing it as a privilege
and basically a question of policy rather than an absolute right.5
Although recognition is the sovereign decision of a nation, many
countries base their refusal to recognize another entity on a concur-
rent claim exerted by either a government in exile or another entity
claiming to be the sole representative government of either a de-
fined geographical area or of a specific population group. While
many Western nations proceeded to recognize the DDR unilaterally,
the United States adopted this latter position, i.e., denying recogni-
tion to the DDR because of the Federal Republic's insistence that it
was the sole representative government of all the German people.6
However, when the Federal Republic abandoned this concept in the
Basic Treaty with the DDR on December 21, 1972, the United States
was obligated, according to principles of international law, to rec-
ognize the DDR, for the West German claim upon which the for-
mer American position rested, had been extinguished. The United
States was extremely lethargic and did not recognize the DDR until
September of 1974, almost two years later. It could be strongly
argued that the United States had violated basic principles of inter-
national law by this unwonted delay. The situation, nevertheless,
graphically illustrates a confrontation between the right of a sover-
eign to determine for itself whether it- will officially recognize an-
other entity' with the fundamental maxims of international law.
5 See BISHOP, INTERNATIONAL LAW 300-393 (1969).
6 Although the modern trend supports the view that once the characteristics of a state
have been achieved a state has an affirmative duty to recognize it, the traditional view,
which appears to still be the majority view, contends that international law has not de-
veloped a rule whereby recognition is obligatory, even when all the characteristics of a
state are met and hence, recognition still remains discretionary with the recognizing state.
See A Preparatory Study Concerning a Draft Declaration on the Rights and Duties of
States, UN Doc. No. A/CN. 4/2 at 192-194. See also LAUTERPACHT, RECOGNITION
IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 32 (1947) for a contrary view.
7 Before recognizing an entity as a state, the recognizing state in good faith is re-
quired to make an honest determination based upon fact that the entity:
(a) has a defined territory and population,
(b) is under the auspices of a regime that satisfies the recognition of a gov-
ernment, i.e.,
(i) it is currently in control of a defined territory and population,
(ii) it has a legitimate claim to the territory it controls,
(iii) it maintains some effective control over the population and,
(iv) the population is generally supportive of the present government,
(c) has the capacity to enter into foreign relations,
(d) reasonably shows it will sustain throughout a reasonable period of time
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While it is very meritorious and noble for the United States to re-
peatedly display good faith toward its allies and their respective
claims, such a policy can be very embarassing as well as self-defeat-
ing. The long awaited recognition of Communist China is such an
example.
The recognition of the DDR by the Federal Republic had, for
some time, faded from the attention of the international community
eclipsed largely by the successful achievements of the Nixon admin-
istration in its foreign policy endeavors. But as far as many theoreti-
cians on dtente are concerned, the recognition of the DDR was a
major step forward in securing future stability in Central Europe.
Today both the Federal Republic and the United States have
recognized the existence of the DDR as a separate German state,
despite disagreements between East and West over the status of
West Berlin, most recently illustrated by the West German attempt
to establish an environmental protection agency in the city. This,
in turns, leads to another serious issue. No matter how one analyzes
the intricacies involved in the recognition of the DDR, the fact re-
mains that Berlin is a problem which must be solved in the near
future. The status of Berlin must be solidified in order to preclude
further speculation over the city's future existence and its role in
German politics.
An agreement on Berlin's future will be more difficult than the
recognition issue due to its unique setting. Lack of historical pre-
cedent complicates the problem further. Berlin, for a considerable
time, appeared to be a never ending stalemate. However, things
changed in 1970 when the Berlin Quadripartite Agreement was
reached among the Four Powers.' But this really was the begin-
ning of another dialogue which must be continued in the future.
Both East and West are now optimistic that a final settlement can
be achieved over the city's future status. Such an agreement would,
without a doubt, effectively remove the thorn which has plagued
dgtente efforts throughout the last quarter century.
The West German Foreign Policy Debate
Following World War II Germany was in shambles. The
Thousand-Year Reich had crumbled under the onslaught of the Al-
lied armies. But now there was a power vacuum in Central Europe
(e) has asserted itself to be a state, that is, has asserted its own declaration
of independence.
8 Signed September 3, 1971, in Berlin.
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and what Adolf Hitler had prophesied many years earlier now had
come true. The clashing of ideologies between East and West
was now to take place on the battlefields of Central Europe. What
once was the Grand Alliance was now marked by mutual distrust
and suspicion.
The West, which naively underplayed the projected role of the
Soviet Union in post-war Europe, finally realized the strategem that
the Kremlin leaders had adopted. Consequently, to prevent further
Soviet expansion, the West, in particular the United States, dedi-
cated itself to a global containment policy.
On the other hand, the Soviet Union, cognizant of the histori-
cal fact that European armies had attacked her from the West, felt
it imperative to her security to establish a buffer zone in Eastern
Europe by creating a series of satellite nations whose political ideol-
ogies coincided with those of the Kremlin. The memory of the last
invasion by the German Wehrmacht was still indelibly etched in
the minds of every Soviet leader and the ubiquitous destruction of
the entire country along with the indescribable hardships suffered
by the Soviet populace were all too recent to be forgotten. Perhaps
one of the greatest failures among Western analysts is their con-
certed refusal to fully appreciate the impact of the devastating Ger-
man-Russian war on post-war Soviet policy objectives.10
Another issue which has largely been ignored by most analysts
is whether the Federal Republic truly needed the assistance and sup-
port of the West in its post-war negotiations with the East. The
thought of enormous quantities of economic aid and military pro-
tection which were pledged by the West at the end of the war, espe-
cially by the United States, was certainly appealing to German in-
dustrialists whose foremost thoughts were directed toward the re-
establishment of production and reentry into the world market.
These industrialists had a profound impact on the CDU and its
leader, Konrad Adenauer. Adenauer and high level Christian Dem-
ocratic leaders believed that economic recovery was essential to the
new Republic and realized that the path to immediate industrializa-
tion could only be achieved through close cooperation with the
9 See generally, W. HANRIEDER, WEST GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY 1949-1963 at
130-139 (1967).
10 See generally, A. ULAM, EXPANSION AND COEXISTENCE: THE HISTORY OF
SOvIET FOREIGN POLICY 1917-67 at 408-539 (1969). See also A. Schlesinger, Ori-
gins of the Cold War in 46 FOREIGN AFFAIRS at 22 (1967) for an illuminating ac-
count of American and Soviet post-war foreign policy objectives in Central and Eastern
Europe.
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West. By aligning with the West, Germany would be the recipi-
ent of large quantities of economic aid which would effectively
ignite the development of the new German economy. At the same
time the Federal Republic would also be guaranteed military pro-
tection and, thus, would not have to divert any expenditures toward
the establishment of a defense system. But so long as the United
States held the key to the reestablishment of the German economy,
the Federal Republic had to acquiesce to the desires of the Ameri-
can government. Adenauer realized this fact, yet reaffirmed time
and again his country's desire to promote stronger relations with the
West. He affirmatively placed economic recovery as the first goal
to be achieved by the new West German government.
Throughout this period of reconstruction reunification with the
East was considered a secondary goal in Bonn's foreign policy ef-
forts. Although the West promised Bonn that it would help the
latter achieve reunification, such support, when it manifested itself,
served to alienate the Soviets. Washington had promised military
support to Bonn with the assurance that a policy of strength would
accelerate the Soviet's desire to reach a settlement on the reunifica-
tion issue. The Germans were persuaded to re-arm, after having
been instructed that their past militaristic tradition was inherently
evil, and were cajoled into joining the North Atlantic Treaty Orga-
nization." Western "internationalists" appeared to assign a higher
priority to European integration and a recovery of German influence
in Western councils than to reunification. 1"a Simultaneously, the
Kremlin made it quite clear that such steps would render reunifica-
tion efforts more difficult.' 2
A chronological accounting of the major events that transpired
during this period is certainly beyond the scope of this article. A
divided Germany serves to remind us how wrong Washington was
in its assessment of Soviet reaction to these events. The Soviet
Union, which had become a world power, certainly was not going
to rush to the negotiating table out of fright. Instead, the Soviets
took counter-measures and reacted with equal vigor to the Western
plan. Not only was an autonomous East German government
formed but a highly disciplined East German army was created as
11 HANRIEDER, supra note 9, at 68-77.
11a Id. at 108-109 and see Schlesinger, supra note 10, where the author examines
the Western adherence to the "universalist" theory and the Soviet view of "balance of
power" during the Cold War period.
12 ULAM, supra note 10, at 496-5 72.
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well. And like the path Bonn had chosen, the DDR similarly be-
came a member of the Warsaw Pact."3
In retrospect one can see that the road to reunification was not
through a policy of strength. The early 1950's revealed a German
population deeply divided on the issues of rearmament and reunifi-
cation chiefly along party lines. The CDU/CSU coalition fa-
vored the policy which Adenauer had chosen. The SPD, then un-
der the tutelage of the dynamic Kurt Schumacher, favored a policy
of strict neutrality. The differences between the two parties rested
primarily in their selection of priorities in foreign policy. Schu-
macher felt that the primary goal of the new West German govern-
ment was to achieve reunification as soon as possible and at any
cost. The farsighted Schumacher realized that a pro-Western policy
would serve to alienate the Soviets and render reunification as an
unattainable goal. 4 Such perception was truly remarkable at that
time.
But the SPD could not gather sufficient support for its neutralistic
platform due to the large segment of radical left-wing discontents
within the party. Consequently, most Germans at this time es-
chewed SPD affiliation in the belief that it had been infiltrated by
many communists."
In a letter dated November 30, 1950 to Konrad Adenauer, the
Minister-President of the DDR, Otto Grotewohl, proposed that an
"All-German Constituent Council" be formed, consisting of an equal
number of representatives from both Germanies. Its task would be
to prepare a constitution for a provisional all-German government,
to work in conjunction with the Four Powers in drafting a peace
treaty, and finally, to organize and oversee all-German elections.
Two months later Chancellor Adenauer rejected this proposal and
demanded that free, general, equal, secret, and direct elections to an
all-German Parliament be conducted in all four Zones under inter-
national supervision. In addition, Adenauer stressed the need to
create preliminary conditions for free elections in the DDR by sub-
stantially changing the non-democratic political system which had
developed there.
Grotewohl accepted Adenauer's demand for international super-
vision of all-German elections and further proposed that all-German
consultations on this matter be commenced at once. Remarkably,
13 January, 1956.
14 HANRIEDER, supra note 1, at 134-135.
15 HANRIEDER, supra note 9, at 106.
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Adenauer in an address to the Bundestag on October 16, 1951, re-
jected Grotewohl's plan by insisting that the Federal Republic would
refrain from discussing the reunification issue unless the DDR was
unreservedly willing to recognize and guaranty a political system
based on the rule of law, a free form of government, the protection
of human rights, and the preservation of peace.16
The opportunity for reunification came again in early 1952 when,
after a basic agreement had been reached in the West on the for-
mation of a European Defense Community, the Soviets directly in-
tervened in the German problem by proffering a series of Notes to
the Western Powers. In their first Note, the Soviets proposed that
a peace treaty be signed with Germany, calling for the direct par-
ticipation of an all-German government on the basis of armed neu-
trality. The formation of a peace treaty would be conditioned upon
the establishment of a German army of limited strength and the
evacuation of Germany by the Four Powers would take place no
later than one year after the peace treaty had been signed. The
West maintained that a pre-requisite for the conclusion of a peace
treaty with Germany was the formation of an all-German govern-
ment on the basis of free and internationally supervised elections.
In the Soviet's second Note it was suggested that a Four Power
commission be formed to examine the conditions under which elec-
tions should be held instead of an examination conducted by a UN
committee. The Western Powers in their second reply firmly re-
jected the Soviet proposal and adhered to their demand for UN
supervision. There was a further exchange of Notes but no agree-
ment was reached due to the divergencies of views centering on the
questions of UN supervision of free elections, as demanded by the
Western Powers, and the neutralization of a reunified Germany as
suggested by the Soviet Union. 7
Reunification, the primary objective of the Bonn government,
according to the Basic Law,' 8 was now lost. The Soviets, much to
their chagrin, had to abandon their compromise efforts. Schumacher
and many Germans were stunned at the news.19 The United States,
however, had doubts about the Soviet proposals throughout the ne-
gotiation period. Were the Soviet proposals seriously intended or
16 Press and Information Office of the Government of the Federal Republic of Ger-
many, the Development of the Relations between the Federal Republic and the German
Democratic Republic 11 (1973).
17 HANDRIEDER, supra note 9, at 73.
18 Known as das Grundgesetz, the equivalent of a constitution.
19 HANRIEDER, supra note 9, at 71.
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were they just an attempt to stall the formation of an European
Defense Community? Also, would a reunified neutral Germany
eventually fall into the Soviet orbit like the other Eastern European
nations ?
While the validity of the first question cannot be doubted, the
same cannot be asserted for the second. Germany was very capable
of remaining neutral in the mid-fifties.20 Although many Western
authorities seriously doubted the German ability to remain neu-
tral, it was quite evident that if the Germans were to vacillate it
would be toward their Western paladins. "1  Obviously, the Soviets
would not have allowed such a drift toward the West to take place
without implementing counter-measures, but it still is questionable
whether the Kremlin's efforts would have been capable of abrogat-
ing the flow of Western sentiment, especially in view of the large
number of German anti-communists. After all, from the German
perspective the Second World War was a struggle to extinguish the
expansion of Communism and to relegate the Soviet state to that
of a docile German protectorate. This contemptuous hatred toward
communist ideology and the Soviet state simply would not dissipate
overnight.
On the other hand, if a neutral Germany developed a more con-
ciliatory attitude toward the Soviets during this period, the West
would have made every effort to stop any sort of rapprochement
with the East, for the entire premise upon which Western European
security depended was on a strong pro-Western Germany. The
strategy of containment necessitated that the power vacuum in Cen-
tral Europe be filled with a potent anti-communist ally of the West.
Nothing less would suffice and the West was willing to pay any
price for this result.22 Whether the Soviets would have risked
everything on Germany when they already had within their grasp
all of Eastern Europe is rather doubtful. This is certainly reflected
in her almost impetuous desire to come to a settlement on the Ger-
man question. In fact, many commentators believed that the So-
viets were rather astonished at the uncompromising and obdurate
attitude displayed by the West in the 1950 to 1952 negotiations.
This lack of flexibility on the part of the Western Powers indirectly
strengthened the aggressive Soviet position. The Kremlin now re-
20 Id. at 74.
21 HANRIEDER, supra note 1, at 131.
22 HANRIEDER, supra note 9, at 52-72. See also Schlesinger, supra note 10.
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alized that the West was content to keep its respective Western
zones rather than risk a unified pro-Soviet Germany. 3
Yet there is another possibility. The efforts and counter-efforts
of the superpowers might have balanced each other, permitting Ger-
many to remain neutral. This is assuming that the internal German
situation would remain stable. There is authority suggesting that
since Germany was in fact a penetrated system, it would react in
conformity to the external pressures exerted on it. Hence, it was
quite plausible that Germany could have remained neutral in view
of the countervailing strategems of the two superpowers.24
As time progressed, however, the German attitude toward the
accomplishments of Konrad Adenauer oscillated. Where at first
the majority of the population supported his efforts vis-4-vis the
DDR, as the Wirtschaftswunder25 of the early 1950's came to an
end and the economy leveled off during the Erhard administration,
Germans reassessed the utility of the earlier Adenauer policies.
Although the Federal Republic had sustained remarkable eco-
nomic growth in a relatively short period of time, Germans abruptly
realized that placing the economy and security first might have been
a mistake. While many acknowledged that economic prosperity
might not have progressed as rapidly had a more pronounced pro-
reunification policy been adopted, they now questioned whether
economic growth and reunification could have taken place at the
same time.26 This was precisely what Kurt Schumacher advocated
in the early 1950's. He appreciated the advantages of intimate rela-
tions with the West but realized that such a kinship would seriously
endanger German efforts to achieve reunification. Thus, he would
have been extremely recalcitrant in committing Germany to the
Western alliance system. He felt instead that the road to reunifica-
tion rested in neutrality between the superpowers. While Schu-
macher would have accepted American economic aid he would have
resisted all efforts to rearm and incorporate Germany into the NATO
framework. He knew that the latter course of action would doom
all reunification efforts.
Adenauer, on the other hand, overcommitted Germany to the
23 ULAM, supra note 10, at 511-514.
24 For a discussion of penetrated systems, see J. Rosenau, Pre-theories and Theories of
Foreign Policy, in APPROACHES TO COMPARATIVE AND INTERNATIONAL POLITICS,
65 (Farrell ed. 1966).
25 Economic Miracle.
26 See generally, HANRIEDER, supra note, 1, at 136-146.
27 Id. at 134-135.
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West. Reunification, implemented through a policy of strength,
had failed and served instead to deepen the schism between the two
Germanies. Germans on both sides realized for the first time that
different life styles and political systems had developed and were
now realities, and as time progressed many feared, and still do today,
that the division would remain permanent.28 Nevertheless, if there
is a constant in Germanic history it is the quest for unity.29 In many
instances this inherent desire for national unification has had to over-
come almost insurmountable obstacles both internally created by the
German people through their petty regional jealousies and externally
created by hostile neighbors.3" The latter probably has been the
most difficult to overcome, for just as the Germans have always de-
sired unity among themselves, Europeans in general, have feared a
unified Germany. Yet in spite of these difficulties, German efforts
to unify into one German nation have succeeded. The question to-
day is whether the Germans can succeed again in view of the recent
recognition and acceptance of the DDR as a separate and indepen-
dent German state, coupled with the apparent contentment among
the Four Powers to maintain the status quo.
Willy Brandt's Ostpolitik and the Creation of the
Intra-German Dialogue
Willy Brandt, upon taking office as Chancellor of the Federal
Republic was not oblivious to the fact that West German efforts
in the past had consistently failed to draw the two Germanies closer
together. Reunification, the avowed objective of West German for-
eign policy, was certainly not drawing any closer and the estrange-
ment of the two Germanies was no longer a myth but a reality. The
social orders of the two Germanies had become more and more diver-
gent. Germans were living apart and by the mid-sixties no one seri-
ously believed reunification would be forthcoming.
At the same time the international situation had undergone a
fundamental change. It was now evident that any claim of a policy
through strength was unrealistic. 1 Brandt, upon taking office, real-
ized that adherence to former policy could very well result in the
isolation of the Bonn government in international politics 32 espe-
2 8 A. HEIDENHEIMER, THE GOVERNMENTS OF GERMANY 287-313 (1971).
29 J. RHODES, THE QUEST FOR UNITY 48-115,229-284 (1971).
30 R. DAHRENDORF, SOCIETY AND DEMOCRACY IN GERMANY 348-362 (1969).
3 1 A. GROSSER, GERMANY IN OUR TIME 325 (1971).
32 See generally, F. Allemann, A Guide to German Politics, in MEET GERMANY, 22
(Atlantik-Bricke ed. 1971).
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cially at a time when European nations were looking through ideo-
logical differences in search for opportunities to reduce tensions.
At the time Willy Brandt took office, there was little hope that
the German problem would be solved."3 International support for
Bonn's reunification through strength policy had diminished to its
lowest point. Abroad, people were fatigued at the repetitive illusory
demands both Germanies were advancing toward each other. Hence,
a new policy was needed and created - it was called Ostpolitik.
The new administration's Ostpolitik, which initially came as
something of a surprise, was greeted with great enthusiasm by Ger-
man liberals and was bitterly opposed by German conservatives.
In short, Brandt's Ostpolitik was an attempt to normalize Bonn's
relations with the Eastern European countries, including the DDR,
by adopting a realistic attitude toward existing social and political
conditions in these respective areas. 4
The first commitment of the Brandt government was its basic
aim in its foreign policy efforts, namely, the desire for peace and a
reconciliation among nations. The cornerstone of Bonn's new Ost-
politik was officially put on paper when Chancellor Brandt traveled
to Moscow to sign the Soviet-West German treaty renouncing the
use of force. 5 Through this treaty, both countries agreed to respect
without any restrictions, the territorial integrity of all states in Eu-
rope including their present frontiers by specifically mentioning the
Oder-Neisse line as well as the frontier between the Federal Repub-
lic and the DDR. In return, Moscow renounced some legal bases,
such as Articles 53 and 107" of the United Nations Charter, which
they had earlier claimed gave them special powers to intervene in
German affairs, and further recognized the legitimacy of Bonn's ad-
herence to the NATO Alliance. Although Bonn obviously relin-
quished its legal claim with regard to the recoverability of the Eastern
territories and to modes of implementing German reunification,
Brandt was quick to point out in a television broadcast from Moscow
that nothing was lost with the signing of this treaty that was not
331d. at 21.
34 Id.
35 Signed August 12, 1970.
30 Article 107 of the UN Charter reads: "Nothing in the present Charter shall
invalidate or preclude action, in relation to any state which during the Second
World War has been an enemy of any signatory to the present Charter, taken
or authorized as a result of that war by the governments having responsibility
for such action."
37 HEIDENHEIMER, supra note 28, at 308.
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lost a long time ago.17  The subsequent treaty with Poland,38 also
settling the controversial German-Polish frontier problem, the Basic
Treaty39 with the DDR, and the Treaty of Prague" all have demon-
strated Bonn's dramatic desire to affect a detente with the East.
Brandt's Ostpolitik obviously was a serious departure from the
fundamental tenets of Bonn's former foreign policy under Konrad
Adenauer. It quickly drew the criticism of the CDU/CSU which
depicted Brandt's efforts as an outright capitulation to the Soviets.
Although the CDU/CSU reluctantly gave its approval to the re-
nunciation of force treaty with the Soviets, the subsequent steps that
were taken by Brandt went far beyond the contemplation of most
conservatives.
Until the recognition of the DDR, all previous German admin-
istrations adhered to the assertion that the Federal Republic, being
the only freely elected German government, was the only legitimate
representative of the entire German people.4 This fortuitous claim
of being the so-called "sole representative," which was indorsed by
the Western Powers in the Paris Treaties of 1955, eventually gave
birth to the Hallstein Doctrine. This fatuous doctrine considered
any recognition of the DDR by other states, as an unfriendly act
toward the Federal Republic. In many instances, Bonn would re-
taliate by going so far as severing all diplomatic relations with such
recognizing states.
Until recently, most of the political parties in the Federal Re-
public rejected any conclusive settlement of the Eastern borders,
which, since the termination of the Second World War, run through
the territory of the former Greater German Reich. And despite the
fact that even the conservatives in the CDU/CSU were willing to
renounce the use of force, they were not prepared to enter into an
agreement altering these former borders by peaceful means. The
CDU/CSU under the aegis of Adenauer had adopted a position in-
sisting that only a formal peace treaty with the Reich's former
enemies could conclusively settle the controversy over the Eastern
borders and this could only take place after the reunification; the
existing territorial boundaries of Germany were, therefore, merely
provisional in nature.42
Since the departure of Adenauer, these legalistic arguments ad-
38 Signed December 7, 1970.
39 Signed December 21, 1972.
40 Signed December 11, 1973.
41 Allemann, supra note 32, at 22.
421d.
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vanced by the CDU/CSU, all of which were based upon post-war
agreements with the Four Powers, have become more of a fiction
than a reality for a number of reasons. First, the discussions con-
cerning reunification of Germany have become a dead issue. Second,
the Western Powers have considered German reunification as too
complex and controversial a subject to be placed on the negotiating
table again. 43  Third, the rapid consolidation and economic growth
of the DDR since the building of the Berlin Wall in 1961 has elimi-
nated the hope that the East German regime would collapse inter-
nally. All of these factors raised the issue whether continued pro-
test over the maintenance of the status-quo had any practical
significance and whether such insistence on revision restricted the
scope and maneuverability of Bonn's foreign policy. Brandt's ad-
ministration faced these issues squarely and resolved them by abolish-
ing the Hallstein Doctrine and declaring existing borders as "invio-
lable." A total renouncement of all Eastern territorial claims fol-
lowed shortly thereafter.
In the negotiations in Warsaw, Bonn gave the Poles the assur-
ance that the Federal Republic was no longer going to attempt any
revision of the Oder-Neisse frontier. In return, Warsaw tacitly
agreed that it would make it somewhat easier for Germans re-
siding in these areas to emigrate to the Federal Republic and the
DDR. And in his initial relations with the DDR, which Bonn at
first refused to recognize as a "foreign country," Brandt believed that
treaties and agreements which would be binding under international
law, should, nevertheless, be promulgated between the two Ger-
manies so that both could find a rapprochement with each other via
an orderly and peaceful coexistence.44
Although these new policies of the Brandt administration were
more than a mere modification of the old Adenauer positions, the
new Ostpolitik carried with it a profound determination to create
a state of peace in Europe in which the German people could even-
tually regain their unity in free self-determination.4" What Brandt
ingeniously accomplished was to divorce the reunification issue
from Bonn's endeavors to create an intra-German dialogue and
detente in Eastern Europe. Previous administrations had accom-
43 Id.
44 Id.
45 Press and Information Office of the Government of the Federal Republic of Ger-
many, Speech given by Federal Chancellor Brandt before the General Assembly of the
United Nations on the Accession of the Federal Republic of Germany to the United
Nations, September 26, 1973, 12 (1973).
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plished little by steadfastly insisting that reunification was an inte-
gral part of West German foreign policy. Brandt now succeeded in
regaining the mobility and initiative in foreign affairs that had been
lost by previous administrations. Reunification was no longer viewed
as a pre-requisite for the normalization of relations with the East.
Where Adenauer, Erhard, and Kiesinger had refused to even speak
of the DDR as a German state, Brandt emphatically voiced his ad-
ministration's desire to enter into discussions with the DDR on any
subject. There was no longer any reason to ignore the existence of
a separate entity to the East and Brandt was prepared, once recog-
nition of the DDR had been achieved coupled with the latter's own
desire to improve German relations, to seek entry into the United
Nations.
Although Brandt's Ostpolitik was considered experimental and
tentative at first, it was evident from the outset that the Chancellor
was planning to modify and in some cases, completely abandon
former principles which had previously guided the Federal Repub-
lic's foreign policy efforts toward the East. Despite the carefully
worded reservations inserted in the Treaties of Moscow, Warsaw,
and Prague, most of which were implanted to placate the bogus fears
of many conservatives in the CDU/CSU, nothing could alter the
fact that Bonn had finally accepted the status quo. The basis of
peaceful relations with all European countries would be rebuilt from
a fundamental appreciation of realpolitik and pragmatism. By des-
ignating that the agreements reached with the Soviets, Poles, Czechs,
and the DDR were integral parts of a uniform policy, Bonn reiter-
ated that its goal was to advance on a broad front toward the War-
saw Pact countries.46
The opposition CDU/CSU was skeptical of Brandt's new form-
ula of d~tente in Eastern Europe. Frequently calling this consistent
relinquishment of German interests as akin to a second uncondi-
tional surrender, the CDU/CSU maintained that the effect of
Brandt's efforts with the East was a renunciation of the fundamen-
tal goal of reunification and, thus, an outright betrayal to the seven-
teen million enslaved Germans in the DDR who no longer had any
chance of expressing their future political desires. The ultimate re-
sult, the conservatives argued, was that Brandt's Ostpolitik indirectly
aided the Soviets by guaranteeing the final incarceration of all the
oppressed peoples in Eastern Europe.
Brandt's reply to this criticism rested in his belief that consistent
46 Allemann, supra note 32, at 23.
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repetition of verbal claims which long ago were recognized as illu-
sory, served to aggravate the German problem and deepen the
animosities between the Federal Republic and Eastern European na-
tions. The balance of power in Europe necessitated the discarding
of untenable claims if one hoped to avert the further estrangement
between the two Germanies and among Europeans in general.4"
The attempt to isolate the DDR internationally by means of the
Hallstein Doctrine became more ludicrous as time progressed. In
many instances governments flatly ignored Bonn's warnings and
established diplomatic relations with the DDR. Other third world
governments, notably the poorer nations, realized they could get ad-
ditional foreign aid from Bonn if they announced their future in-
tention to recognize the DDR. In these latter cases, Bonn found
that adherence to the doctrine could be quite expensive.
It also appeared to Brandt that it was fruitless to expect the
DDR to come to an agreement expanding the travel and visitation
rights of its own people to the Federal Republic when Bonn re-
peatedly refused to recognize it as a state. The discussions with
Willi Stoph in 1970 at Erfurt48 and Kassel4" were efforts on Brandt's
part to resolve this question by conceding that the two states were
"equals," not the same as outright recognition of the DDR, which
the latter insisted upon, but indeed very close to it. Moscow sudden-
ly became willing to discuss the vexing Berlin question on a more
amicable basis; the result was the Quadripartite Agreement of 1971.
Seven months later the Federal Republic and the DDR signed the
Traffic Treaty,5 ° the first State treaty to be concluded between the
two states.
The latter treaty regularized the traffic between the Federal Re-
public and the DDR and provided access to a number of new traffic
facilities. For the first time, West Germans were now permitted to
travel to the DDR at the invitation of friends as well as relatives.
Tourist travel was liberalized and inhabitants of the DDR could
now visit the Federal Republic for urgent family reasons.
The outcome of the negotiations on the Traffic Treaty proved
that despite the different political and legal arguments presented by
both sides, the two German states were capable of agreeing on a
difficult matter. But perhaps the greatest triumph for both the
47Id.
4SMarch 19, 1970.
49 May 21, 1970.
50 Signed May 26, 1972.
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Brandt administration as well as the DDR was the signing in East
Berlin of the Treaty on the Basis of Relations Between the Federal
Republic and the DDR. As Willy Brandt so adroitly stated, "We
have organized the modus vivendi and will have to learn the coexis-
tence. '"51 It was the culmination of a realistic policy which was de-
signed to prevent the further alienation between the two states by
reducing tensions and by strengthening the German people's feeling
of belonging together. In their mutual relationship, both German
States agreed to be guided by the purposes and principles of the
United Nations Charter. These included the reciprocal renuncia-
tion of force, the right of self-determination and the preservation
of human rights. Moreover, the Treaty did not conflict with any
provision in the Federal Republic's Basic Law or affect any of the
rights or responsibilities of the Four Powers. 2
One aspect of the Treaty which is often overlooked is the reten-
tion of the Brandt concept of two German States within one German
nation. Although the Federal Republic recognizes the DDR as an
independent state with autonomy in her internal and external af-
fairs, the Federal Republic does not consider the DDR as a "foreign
country." This is evidenced by the agreement not to exchange
ambassadors but rather permanent missions." It is a unique concept
in international law, to say the least. International legal scholars
would be hard pressed to find precedent whereby one country rec-
ognized another entity as a separate, self-governing state, yet refused
to concede that this same entity was a foreign country. Bonn's
position seems to be a semantical contradiction in itself, conceding
51 Federal Chancellor Brandt, Statement on the Conclusion of the Negotiations, No-
vember 7, 1972, in East Berlin.
52 The Development of Relations, supra note 16, at 45.
58 Id. See also W. Geck, Germany and Contemporary International Law in 9 TEXAS
INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL 3 at 263 for a general discussion and analysis of the
Basic Treaty including the interpretation placed upon such by the Federal Constitutional
Court.
The treaty was not, however, an unqualified victory for the German Democratic
Republic. The preamble mentioned the different views of both states 'on fun-
damental questions, including the national question.' Geck at 272.
The Court viewed the recognition of the German Democratic Republic as a
mere de facto recognition of a special character. . . .For the Constitutional
Court, the [Basic] Treaty had a dual character: in form it was an international
treaty, but in content, a treaty regulating inter-se relations .... To the Court,
the treaty left no doubt that the frontier between the two states was a staatrecht-
liche Grenze, that is a frontier not of international character, but rather, similar
to the boundaries between the member states in the Federal Republic. . . . In
essence, the Court interpreted the treaty in a matter conforming to its own strict
constitutional standards by playing down the agreement reached in the treaty
and playing up the disagreement in the national question. Geck at 274.
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full recognition to the DDR, i.e., in its relations with other nations
within the international community, yet denying it full diplomatic
recognition in its relationship with the Federal Republic. Or does
the Basic Treaty really confer full diplomatic recognition on the
DDR? Can it be argued that the exchange of permanent missions
is equivalent to the exchange of ambassadors? If it isn't full rec-
ognition, it certainly is pretty close. On the other hand, internation-
al law doesn't create an affirmative duty on the recognizing state to
consider the newly acknowledged state as a foreign country." How-
ever, there is legal authority which suggests that once the character-
istics of a state have been achieved, it must be afforded full recogni-
tion in all respects.55 This is a gray area which has consistently been
the focus of debate among legal scholars and as a consequence,
there is really no definitive answer.
The Basic Treaty can best be described as a great compromise.
From the DDR's viewpoint, the Treaty granted something it had
been trying to achieve for years, notably international recognition
by the Federal Republic. Concurrently, Brandt continued to follow
the mandate of the Basic Law, that is, to continue to work for peace
in which the German nation can recover its unity through self-de-
termination56 while at the same time realistically recognizing the
existence of a separate political and social system within the DDR.
By refusing to concede that the DDR is a "foreign state," Brandt
left open the possibility of future reunification. With the signing
of the Basic Treaty, he succeeded in breaching the communication
gap between the two Germanies; he successfully initiated the de-
velopment of a viable intra-German dialogue. Brandt reasoned that
as time progresses, and as relations between the two German States
gradually intensify, it is inevitable that the German people will de-
mand reunification. 7 It is psychologically irresistible; the quest for
unity among Germans simply is a historical fact of life. 8 Just when
reunification will occur is still too speculative a question to answer.
It seems to this writer, nevertheless, a brilliant strategy conceived
by a most gifted statesman.
54 See note 6.
55 LAUTERPACHT, supra note 6, at 32.
56 Press and Information Office of the Government of the Federal Republic of Ger-
many, Speech give by Foreign Minister Scheel before the General Assembly of the United
Nations on the Accession of the Federal Republic of Germany to the United Nations,
September 19, 1973, at 4 (1973).
57 See Brandt Speech, supra note 45, at 12.
58 See generally, DAHRENDORF, supra note 30, at 17-31, 188-207, 381-397.
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What the international community has witnessed within the
past five years is a drastic face-lifting of West German foreign pol-
icy. Although his strategy and tactics were diametrically the oppo-
site of those employed by former administrations, Brandt accom-
plished more in a shorter period of time than his three predecessors
put together. He regained the initiative and mobility in foreign af-
fairs that had previously been lost. Reconciliation had replaced
confrontation. Respect within the international community had
once more been achieved. But most important, West German for-
eign policy had finally matured and ddtente in Central Europe ad-
vanced significantly.
Berlin
The Berlin problem has always been an acrimonious issue for
the Federal Republic. Part of the frustration is that Bonn can ne-
gotiate neither with the Soviets nor the DDR. Since the city is still
governed by the Four Powers in accordance with the Potsdam Agree-
ment, 59 Bonn must negotiate with all four nations. Bonn has in-
sisted throughout the years that West Berlin is a legitimate concern
of the Federal Republic. The Soviets and the DDR contend, on the
other hand, that the city is an independent political entity over
which Bonn has no control.6" To a certain degree, the Western
Powers have also considered West Berlin as a separate entity apart
from the Federal Republic, nevertheless, they have accepted and
acquiesced in the extensive economic and political contacts which
Bonn has made with the city.
These contacts have been declared illegal by the Soviets. Bonn,
on the other hand, believes these close ties with West Berlin are as
much a reality as the existence of the DDR and its eastern borders.
It expects the Soviets to adopt a realistic attitude on Berlin just as
Bonn has done with the existence of the DDR and in its other rela-
tions with the Warsaw Pact countries.
A compromise on this controversial issue was finally reached with
the signing of the Quadripartite Agreement in 1971 when the Krem-
lin finally agreed to guarantee and respect the present situation in
Berlin. The Soviets further agreed to allow uninterrupted access
to the city in return for Bonn's assurances that it would curtail its
efforts to create further political ties with West Berlin.
59 Signed August 2, 1945.
60 Allemann, supra note 32, at 24; Press and Information Office of the Government
of the Federal Republic of Germany, The Quadripartite Agreement on Berlin of Septem-
ber 3, 1971, at 65 (1971).
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Bonn welcomed the fact that it was possible to arrive at a prac-
tical arrangement without altering the status of Berlin and with-
out upsetting the legal positions of the Four Powers responsible for
the city.6 Among the substantial improvements for West Berlin
were (i) that civilian traffic between the Federal Republic and West
Berlin would be unimpeded and its clearance at crossing points
simplified, (ii) that freedom of movement of the inhabitants of
West Berlin would be enlarged by providing visitation rights to the
eastern portions of the city as well as to the DDR and, (iii) West
Berlin could properly be represented by Bonn in international
agreements and conferences together with the guarantee that resi-
dents of the city would be able to enjoy consular protection from
the Federal Republic.
Whether the close ties which exist between West Berlin and
the Federal Republic have been underlined and reaffirmed as to
their existence and further development remains to be seen, espe-
cially in view of the interpretation the Soviets place on Part II,
Subsection B of the Agreement.62
Bonn, however, believes the Quadripartite Agreement has not
altered the basic legal relationship between the Federal Republic
and West Berlin. This can be seen in Bonn's repeated belief that
German constitutional law, i.e., the relevant portions of the Basic
Law pertaining to West Berlin, remains unaltered, except where
preempted by the reserved rights retained by the Western Powers. 3
Since Bonn has always considered these preceding rights of the Al-
lied Powers to be in the best interests of Berlin's security, the Fed-
eral Republic has deferred to the responsibility incumbent on the
Powers. 4 The latter, by virtue of precedent, maintain that Berlin
cannot, in accordance with these reserved powers, be considered
a Land of the Federal Republic. 5 Hence, the Western Powers have
referred to the city in such a manner that it is neither fully included
in the constitutional organization of the Federal Republic nor gov-
erned directly by West German law. As a consequence, the city
61 Id. at 45.
62 Part II, Subsection B of the Berlin Quadripartite Agreement reads: "The
Governments of the French Republic, the United Kingdom and the United
States of America declare that the ties between the Western Sectors of Berlin
and the Federal of Germany will be maintained and developed, taking into
account that these Sectors continue not to be a constituent part of the Federal
Republic of Germany and not to be governed by it."
63 Quadripartite Agreement, supra note 60, at 46.
64 Id.
65 Id. at 62.
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does not have the same status as the Federal Linder. Therefore, the
relevant portions of German constitutional law are not nullified,
but remain suspended so long as the three Western Powers, in exer-
cising their rights and responsibilities pursuant to Article 1 on the
Convention on the Relations between the Federal Republic and the
Three Powers,66 adhere to this view.
The controversy and disagreement over the Quadripartite Agree-
ment rests in Bonn's belief that existing ties between the Federal
Republic and Berlin can not only be maintained but expanded as
well. Within this interpretation, Bonn believes that Federal organs
will be able to make their appearance in West Berlin; that estab-
lished procedures concerning the applicability to West Berlin of
legislation of the Federal Republic as well as the application of
its laws by administrative and court authorities, remain unchanged
and might be further developed in the future.
The Soviets read the Agreement differently, asserting that politi-
cal ties with the Federal Republic must remain at their present level.
This is reflected in the recent controversy whereby the Soviets de-
layed traffic to and from West Berlin in retaliation to Bonn's es-
tablishment of an environmental protection agency in West Berlin.
It appears that the Soviets, in interpreting Part II(B) of the Quad-
ripartite Agreement, make a fine distinction between the develop-
ment of social and governmental ties between Bonn and West Ber-
lin. While acknowledging that social ties might be intensified in
the future, Moscow firmly believes that the development of gov-
ernmental ties is clearly negated by the explicit language used
in the section. Otherwise the latter portion of the section is verbose
and meaningless. From an omniscient view, this writer believes
the Soviets to be on sound footing in their interpretation of this
particular section of the Agreement. Nevertheless, the controversy
raises a most interesting construction problem.
The mechanics of the Agreement, to say the least, need to be
thoroughly analyzed and explored by all parties. Bonn is well
aware that this Berlin agreement, the first stage of which is now in
existence, cannot solve the entire Berlin problem. But it believes
that this Agreement provides a framework upon which further
agreements may be built and developed with the ultimate aim of
freeing Berlin as a center of controversy as well as strengthening
the city's viability.
Further progress on the issue of West Berlin was reached during
66 Signed May 26, 1952.
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the three days of summit-level negotiations with Soviet leaders in
Moscow by Chancellor Schmidt on October 30, 1974. Indications
reveal that Kremlin leaders might be making some adjustments in
their intransigence over West Berlin. Despite the fact that the is-
sue of West Berlin was treated obliquely in a joint communique
by Chancellor Schmidt and Soviet party leader Brezhnev, it appeared
that Moscow has finally recognized West Berlin's link to the Fed-
eral Republic in a limited economic context, although not yet in a
political one.
Conclusion
The primary aim of Bonn's foreign policy today continues to
remain the same as it did in 1949: the Federal Republic will con-
tinue to work for a state of peace in Europe in which the German
nation will recover its unity in free self-determination. The only
significant difference today is the adoption of different tactics to
achieve these goals. A more realistic attitude now guides Bonn's
foreign policy efforts: it is more flexible where it used to be mechan-
ical; it is more innovative where it used to be unimaginative; and it
is more concilliatory where it used to be bellicose.
The man who succeeded in turning around Bonn's foreign policy
was Willy Brandt, former anti-Nazi and mayor of West Berlin.
Under his guidance Bonn quickly won respect within the interna-
tional community and became a leader in European d~tente efforts.
But the path he chose wasn't an easy one. Throughout his term as
chancellor he was consistently attacked by the opposition CDU/
CSU; he challenged concepts and policies that were sacred to pre-
vious administrations. In order for his Ostpolitik to perform prop-
erly, he had to change the attitudes not only of his fellow Germans,
but other European countries as well. Although met with great
criticism at first, Brandt proved resilient to these vicissitudes and
demonstrated to the world that he was the great statesman that many
thought he was.
Although the Federal Republic recognized the DDR as a separate
German entity, Brandt adhered to the doctrine of two German
States within one German nation. In several passages of his speech
before the General Assembly of the United Nations he specifically
states, "my people live in two States, but they have not ceased to
regard themselves as one nation.''67 This was the basic premise
from which Brandt advanced his Ostpolitik. He correctly knew that
67 Brandt Speech, supra note 45, at 10.
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reunification, if it ever is to occur, could only be achieved through
the creation of an intra-German dialogue and intensifying contacts
to such a degree that unification must naturally follow. Instead of
viewing the DDR from a hostile vantage point, Brandt sought out
amity. The DDR was not an enemy but part of a nation, the Ger-
man nation. In Brandt's view there could be no real capitulation
to the DDR in a theorectical sense, for one could never capitulate to
one's own people. His mission was not to disparage the DDR, but
instead to help it and at the same time assist its people.
In his attempt to place relations with the East on a firmer basis
by approaching problems from a realistic viewpoint, Brandt at the
outset indicated his desire to strenghen ties with the West. Upon
assuming office, Brandt made it quite clear that in order for his
Ostpolitik to achieve any success, strong ties with the West were
essential. Bonn could only achieve the flexibility and maneuvera-
bility it sought by cementing itself firmly within the framework of
the NATO Alliance.
Although the Western Powers at first viewed Brandt's Ostpolitik
with much suspicion, as time progressed they completely indorsed
his efforts. After two decades of denying its existence and refusing
to call it by its official name, the United States, the last and most
important Western holdout, finally recognized the DDR. The rec-
ognition of the DDR is really the end of the beginning. It signifies
a step in the process of ddtente and in the relaxation of tension in
Europe.
Both the Federal Republic and the United States are in subsantial
agreement that the establishment of diplomatic relations between
the United States and the DDR neither will nor could change the
special legal situation in Germany. The rights and responsibilities
which the Four Powers exercise with regard to Berlin and Germany
as a whole remain unaffected. Bonn links the American recogni-
tion of East Germany with the hope that direct contacts between
the two countries will produce advantages in all areas - politically,
economically, and culturally - for the people in the DDR.
The upcoming task for Chancellor Schmidt is not an easy one.
Although he has stated that he intends to follow the policies laid
down by Willy Brandt, this may prove quite difficult. Schmidt's
strength rests in economics and finance. It is doubtful that he pos-
sesses the acumen in foreign affairs that his predecessor had. Wheth-
er he will pursue Brandt's Ostpolitik with the same vigor as the
former chancellor remains to be seen. Brandt was able to command
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a great deal of respect within diplomatic circles; he had that char-
ismatic quality and personality which seems to be an inherent trade-
mark among great leaders. While Schmidt has proven his capacity
to lead, he lacks the dynamic, intense personality of his predecessor.
If Bonn's relations with the DDR are to improve, the intra-
German dialogue must continue but with even more enthusiasm
than before. Trade, cultural and social ties must be strengthened.
Travel restrictions between the two Germanies must be relaxed and
improved. Whether Helmut Schmidt can surpass the achievements
of Willy Brandt is rather doubtful. His success in bettering relations
with the DDR will depend on his tenure as chancellor, and this in
turn will depend on the success of his domestic policies.
In order to effectuate Ostpolitik further, West German leaders
should give serious consideration to the prospect of steering the Fed-
eral Republic's foreign policy efforts in still a new direction. Link-
age with the West in the fifties to many was out of necessity. Eco-
nomic aid and security were the overriding concerns of many Ger-
mans and to a large extent, were legitimate reasons for aligning
with the West. But today in this age of dtente these considera-
tions are no longer tenable arguments for the overly pro-Western
attitude to which Bonn adheres, especially in view of the reunifica-
tion issue. The Federal Republic has demonstrated beyond question
that its economy is the strongest among European nations. More-
over, West Germany has the capacity to create its own defense sys-
tem apart from the Western Powers. These factors indicate that
those basic premises upon which the Federal Republic entered the
Western Alliance no longer exist.
In addition, history has revealed that the reticence exhibited by
the Soviet Union on the issue of reunification has revolved around
the intimate ties which the Federal Republic maintains with the
West. It seems logical that if the Federal Republic truly desires to
accelerate the reunification process, it should consider gradually
withdrawing from the Atlantic Alliance. West Germany no longer
needs the assistance of the West either economically or militarily
as it did in the post-war period, and it has been shown that associa-
tion with the West has served to impede reunification efforts. 8 This
suggestion is assuming, of course, that the Federal Republic still con-
siders reunification the principal objective of its foreign policy ef-
forts. The credibility of West German leadership certainly should
be questioned if circumstances disclose the converse.
68 HANREIDER, supra note 1, at 129.
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An indication of Bonn's desire to disengage from the Western
Alliance could further prompt the withdrawal of the DDR from
the Warsaw Pact, provided the Soviet Union is still serious in its
intention to reach a final settlement on the German question. And
today if the superpowers suggested that a reunified neutral Ger-
many be created in much the same manner as the Soviets suggested
in the early fifties, there is no reason to believe that Germans would
oppose such a plan. Those resisting such a proposal, specifically
those countries which have historically feared a reunified Germany,
would obviously indicate their vehement disapproval. But it is
highly dubious whether their concerted actions would have a decisive
impact on the ultimate arbiters.
Granted the disengaging from the respective camps by both
Germanies might be a painfully slow and complicated process, but
it cannot be denied that from the German viewpoint the end result
would be most gratifying. Leaders of both Germanies should seri-
ously reexamine the merits of a plan calling for the reunification
of a neutral Germany, for it is this writer's belief that stability in
Europe would then be insured for generations to come.
KARL M. SCHWENKEL
APPENDIX
TREATY ON THE BASIS OF RELATIONS BETWEEN
THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY AND THE
GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC*
The High Contracting Parties,
In consideration of their responsibility for the preservation of peace,
Anxious to contribute to detente and security in Europe,
Conscious that the inviolability of frontiers and respect for the territorial
integrity and sovereignty of all States in Europe within their present fron-
tiers are a fundamental condition for peace,
Recognizing that therefore the two German States are to refrain from
the threat or use of force in their relations,
Proceeding from the historical facts and without prejudice to the differ-
ing views of the Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic
Republic on questions of principle, including the national question,
Guided by the desire to create the conditions for cooperation between
the Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic
for the benefit of the people in the two German States, have agreed as
follows:
* Source: Treaty on the Basis of Relations between the Federal Republic of Ger-
many and the German Democratic Republic, published by the Press and Information Of-
fice of the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany (1973).
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Article 1
The Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic
shall develop normal good-neighbourly relations with each other on the basis
of equal rights.
Article 2
The Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic
will be guided by the purposes and principles embodied in the United Na-
tions Charter, in particular the sovereign equality of all States, respect for
independence, autonomy and territorial integrity, the right of self-determina-
tion, the preservation of human rights, and non-discrimination.
Article 3
In accordance with the United Nations Charter, the Federal Republic of
Germany and the German Democratic Republic shall settle their disputes
exclusively by peaceful means and refrain from the threat or use of force.
They reaffirm the inviolability now and in the future of the border exist-
ing between them and undertake fully to respect their territorial integrity.
Article 4
The Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic
proceed on the assumption that neither of the two States can represent the
other internationally or act in its name.
Article 5
The Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic
will promote peaceful relations between the European States and contribute
to security and co-operation in Europe.
They shall support the efforts to reduce armed forces and armaments in
Europe without disadvantages being allowed to arise therefrom for the se-
curity of those concerned.
With the aim of general and complete disarmament under effective in-
ternational control, the Federal Republic of Germany and the German Demo-
cratic Republic will support efforts serving international security to achieve
armaments limitation and disarmament, especially with regard to nuclear
weapons and other weapons of mass destruction.
Article 6
The Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Repub-
lic proceed on the principle that the jurisdiction of each of the two States is
confined to its own territory. They shall each respect the other's indepen-
dence and autonomy in its internal and external affairs.
Article 7
The Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic
state their readiness to regulate practical and humanitarian questions in the
process of the normalization of their relations. They will conclude agree-
ments with a view to developing and promoting cooperation in the fields
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of economics, science and technology, traffic, judicial relations, posts and tele-
communications, health, culture, sport, environmental protection, and in
other fields, on the basis of the present Treaty and for their mutual benefit.
The details have been agreed in the Supplementary Protocol.
Article 8
The Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Repub-
lic will exchange permanent missions.
They will be established at the respective seat of government.
Practical questions relating to the establishment of the missions will be
dealt with separately.
Article 9
The Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic
are agreed that the present Treaty does not affect the bilateral and multilateral
international treaties and agreements previously concluded by them or con-
cerning them.
Article 10
The present Treaty is subject to ratification and shall enter into force
on the day after the exchange of appropriate notes.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the plenipotentiaries of the High Contract-
ing Parties have signed this Treaty.
DONE at Berlin, on 21 December 1972, in two originals in the German
language.
For the For the
Federal Republic German Democratic
of Germany Republic
Egon Bahr Michael Kohl
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